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1 Abstract
Wederive universal codes for transmission of broadcast and confidential messages over classical-quantum-
quantum and fully quantum channels. These codes are robust to channel uncertainties considered in the
compound model. To construct these codes we generalize random codes for transmission of public mes-
sages, to derive a universal superposition coding for the compound quantum broadcast channel. As an
application, we give a multi-letter characterization of regions corresponding to capacity of the compound
quantum broadcast channel for transmitting broadcast and confidential messages simultaneously. This is
done for two types of broadcast messages, one called public and the other common.
A version of this paper is published in Journal of Mathematical Physics 61, 042204 (2020). Also, parts of the
results will be presented and published at International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) 2020.
2 Introduction
Assuming the state of a channel, connecting two sides of a communication, to be perfectly known by
the communicating parties, that would require their complete knowledge of all the relevant physical pa-
rameters of the communication channel, is an idealization that often cannot be achieved in real-world
applications. The compound channel model, in which the communicating parties only have access to an
uncertainty set to which the state of the channel belongs, invokes coding strategies that are robust to such
uncertainties. The size of this uncertainty set, depends on the strategy and physical resources used for
channel estimation, and under real-life physical communication conditions, will in general be infinite.
Relaxing the assumption of the perfectly known channel, requires coding strategies that work for all chan-
nels belonging to a set of possibly infinite cardinality and are hence, significantly more sophisticated. A
case in point is the coding strategy established by the authors of the current paper in [17] to derive ca-
pacity results for simultaneous transmission of classical (public) messages and quantum information over
the quantum channel, given that those developed for the perfectly known channel in [21] did not provide
the structure needed to deal with channel uncertainty. The compound model consists of an indexed set of
channels {Ws}s∈S . A channel from this uncertainty set is used in a memoryless fashion for communication,
requiring the codes to be reliable for the set {W⊗ns }s∈S , where the channel is used n ∈N times.
Information theoretically, the compound model has yielded intriguing properties. One of the interesting
information theoretic properties of the compound channel, is that in general, a strong converse cannot be
established on the capacity of the compound classical-quantum channel for message transmission, when
upper-bounding of the average decoding error is considered. This holds even for finite uncertainty sets
[1, 2, 13]. This observation implies that a second order capacity theorem cannot be developed in this case.
Further, calculation of the so called ǫ-capacity of the compound channel under the average error criterion
is still an open question. We note however, that determining a second order ǫ-capacity for the compound
channel is not possible, due to the observation, that there are examples of the compound channel where
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the optimistic ǫ-capacity is strictly larger than its pessimistic one (see [15] Remark 13). In [4] Section 3,
Ahlswede posed the question of whether or not there exist simple recursive formulas for the ǫ-capacity of
the compound channel. This question, being of great practical significance as discussed in the concluding
remarks here, was answered negatively by authors of [15]. We note also, the importance of codes devel-
oped for the compound channel, for another prominent channel model, namely the arbitrarily varying
channel (see e.g. [3]), where an active jamming party is present.
We consider the compound quantum broadcast channel, connecting one sender to two receivers of differ-
ent permissions or priorities. The channel is used to perform an integrated task, in which a confidential
message, kept secret from the third party, is communicated simultaneously with a broadcast message
available to both receivers. The requirements on the broadcast message, determine two communication
scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider the case where both receivers are required to decode the
broadcast message. We refer to this message as the common message. In the second scenario the decoding
condition is relaxed on one of the receivers. That is, the third party, namely the receiver from whom the
confidential message is kept secret, may or may not decode the broadcast message, to which, in this sce-
nario, we refer as the public message.
The capacity of the channel for performing such tasks, will include trade-off regions, determining the
resourcefulness of the public/common message transmission capacity, for enhancement of confidential
message transmission. Information theoretic analysis of these tasks, will naturally be significant when re-
gions beyond those achieved by simple time-sharing between the two tasks are achieved. We first consider
the case where the sender is restricted to classical inputs, namely the classical-quantum-quantum (cqq)
broadcast model. This model proves useful for obtaining capacity results for the fully quantum broadcast
model, where this restriction is lifted.
The classical counterparts of our results were given in [27]. Therein, the authors first derive robust codes
for the bidirectional channel, in which both receivers are meant to decode the message. This commonmes-
sage will then piggyback a public message decoded by Bob. The privacy amplification strategies are then
applied on part of the public codes to obtain information theoretic security via equivocation. We follow
a similar approach in the context of quantum information theory. We obtain codes for the bidirectional
channel (broadcast channel with no security requirement) by generalizing the random codes from [24].
Our generalization of these results (see Appendix B), yields a universal superposition coding for cq chan-
nels. Our input structure allows us to use privacy amplification arguments ([14]) on part of the codebook
to achieve the desired secrecy rates.
The quantum broadcast model in which the channel is assumed to perfectly known by communicating par-
ties was considered in [30, 31], with and without a pre-shared secret key respectively. Therein, the authors
have established a dynamic capacity trade off region using a coding strategy that is channel-dependent.
We use a different strategy in which establish universal superposition codes for the compound bidirec-
tional channel, exploiting properties of Renyi entropies.
Another regime in which the quantum broadcast model with confidential messages has been studied, is
the one-shot (single serving) model. A one-shot dynamic capacity theorem was derived for regions corre-
sponding to tasks of common, public and private message transmission over the quantum channel in [26].
It would be interesting to see if the coding strategies used therein, derived from position based decoding
(see [5, 7, 6]), can be used to design codes for the compound channel model.
In the first section following this introduction, we introduce the notation used in this work. Precise defini-
tions of channel models, codes and rate regions along with our main results for the cqq model are given in
Section 4. We prove the direct part of our capacity results for the cqq model in Section 5, that is followed
by the proof of converse in Section 6. The security criterion that we impose on the confidential message, is
the mutual information between Alice and Eve to be arbitrarily small for large numbers of channel uses.
As the common or indeed the public messages are available to Eve, we require the mentioned mutual in-
formation to be conditioned on the broadcast message. Proving the existence of capacity achieving codes
is done in two steps. First we consider the case where there is no security criterion placed on the messages
sent to Bob and Eve. In this case, we have a bidirectional channel, where Alice, is sending a message to
be decoded by Bob and potentially by Eve (weather Eve decodes this message depends on which scenario
is considered, determining in turn our labeling of it as common or public). Conditioned on this message
(the corresponding codewords are distributed according to a certain structure), Alice is simultaneously
transmitting a second type of message, that is decoded by Bob. The random coding that makes precisely
this task possible, is given by Lemma 9, which is our universal superposition coding result. Application
of this lemma gives us the desired bidirectional codes in forms of Lemma 14 (where the conditioning mes-
sage is common) and 17 (where the conditioning message is public). In the second step, the second type
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of message described above, is used for privacy amplification. We give the code definitions and capacity
results for the fully quantum channel independently in Section 7. Finally, we discuss some further connec-
tions of our results with other approaches in quantum information theory in Section 8, along with other
concluding remarks and directions for future research.
3 Notation and conventions
All Hilbert spaces are assumed to have finite dimensions and are over the field C. All alphabets are also
assumed to have finite dimensions.The set of linear operators from Hilbert space H to itself is denoted by
L(H). We denote the set of states by S (H) := {ρ ∈ L(H) : ρ ≥ 0,tr(ρ) = 1}. Pure states are given by projections
onto one-dimensional subspaces. Given a unit vector x ∈ H, the corresponding pure state will be written
as |x〉〈x|. The set of probability distributions on the finite alphabet X of cardinality |X |, will be denoted by
P (X ). For n ∈N, we define X n :=
{
(x1, . . . ,xn) : xi ∈ X ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
}
. The sequence x will denote elements
of X n. Also, we use bold letters to denote vectors (sequences with more that one element). The probability
distribution p⊗n ∈ P (X n) will be given by n-fold product of p ∈ P (X ), namely p⊗n(x) = p(x1) . . . p(xn) with
x = (x1, . . . ,xn). For any numberM ∈N, we use [M] := {1, . . . ,M}.
The classical quantum (cq) channel W : X → S (H), is a completely positive trace preserving map from
alphabet X to the set of states on Hilbert space H. We denote the set of all such maps by CQ(X ,H). This
set is equipped with the norm ‖ · ‖CQ defined forW ∈ CQ(X ,H) by
‖W ‖CQ:= max
x∈X
‖W (x) ‖1,
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm on L(H). We use the term cqq channel for map V ∈ CQ(X ,H1⊗H2) with two
outcomes in two sets of states on two Hilbert spaces.
A measurement or a positive operator valued measure (POVM) withM ∈N outcomes on Hilbert space
H, is given by anM-tuple (D1, . . . ,DM ) :Di ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [M] and
∑
i∈[M]Di = 1H. With slight abuse of notation,
we write ac := 1H − a for a ∈ L(H).
We use the base two logarithm denoted by log. The von Neumann entropy of a state ρ ∈ S (H) is given by
S(ρ) := −tr(ρ logρ).
Given the state ωAB ∈ S (HA ⊗HB), a closely related quantity, namely the mutual information is given
by
I(A;B,ω) := S(A,ω) + S(B,ω)− S(AB,ω),
where S(γ,ω), indicates the von Neumann entropy of the state ωγ , the marginal state of ω. Consider the
ensemble {p(x),ωxAB} with ωxAB ∈ S (HA ⊗HB) and p ∈ P (X ). We can define a classical-quantum (cq) state
ωXAB ∈ S (C|X | ⊗HA ⊗HB, given some ONB {ex}x∈X ∈C|X | as
ωXAB :=
∑
x∈X
p(x) |ex〉〈ex|X ⊗ωxAB (1)
Note that we have used the suffix X to label the Hilbert space corresponding to alphabetX . The conditional
mutual information is then defined by
I(A;B|X,ωXB) :=
∑
x∈X
I(A;B,ωxAB). (2)
Throughout this work we have made use of finite nets, to approximate arbitrary compound quantum
channels using ones with finite uncertainty sets. Relevant definition and statements on nets, are presented
in Appendix C by Definition 29 and proceeding lemma.
We use ǫn → 0 exponentially as n→∞ or we say ǫn approaches (goes to) zero exponentially, if − 1n logǫn
is a strictly positive constant. We use cl(A) to denote the closure of set A and conv(A) to denote its convex
hull.
4 Basic definitions and main results
In this section we state the main results and definitions for the compound classical-quantum-quantum
(cqq) broadcast channel. The results and definitions related to the fully quantum broadcast channel are
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stated in Section 7. For finite alphabet X and Hilbert spaces HB,HE , let W := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE )
be a set of cqq channels. The compound cqq broadcast channel generated by this set is given by family
{W⊗ns , s ∈ S}∞n=1. In other words, using n instances of the compound channel is equivalent to using n
instances of one of the channels from the uncertainty set. The users of this channel may or may not
have access to the Channel State Information (CSI). In this document, we consider the case where both
users only know the uncertainty set, to which the actual channel belongs. We consider two closely related
communication scenarios of significance, having both appeared in the literature hitherto.
• Broadcasting Common and Confidential messages (BCC), where the compound channel is used
n ∈N times by the sender Alice in control of the input of the channel, to send two types of messages
(m0,mc) simultaneously over the channel.
– m0 ∈ [M0,n], called the common message, that has to be reliably decoded by receiver Bob in
control of Hilbert space HB and Eve in control of Hilbert space HE .
– mc ∈ [Mc,n], called the confidential message, that has to be decoded reliably by Bob while Eve,
the wiretapper, is kept ignorant.
• Transmitting Public and Confidential messages (TPC), where along with the confidential message
mc ∈ [M0,n] and instead of the commonmessage, Alice wishes to send a "public" messagem1 ∈ [M1,n],
that is reliably decoded by Bob while it may or may not be decoded by Eve.
We consider the main concepts and results related to each task in the following. We start with the BCC
scenario. The precise definition of the BCC codes is given by the following.
Definition 1 ( BCC codes). An (n,M0,n ,Mc,n) BCC code for W , is a family C = (E(·|m),DB,m,DE,m0 )m∈M with
M := [M0,n] × [Mc,n], stochastic encoder E : M → P (X n), POVMs (DB,m)m∈M on H⊗nB and (DE,m0 )m0∈[M0,n] on
H⊗nE .
We define the transmission error functions, for any cqq broadcast channel W : X → S (HB ⊗HE ) and
n ∈N by
• eB(C,W⊗n) := 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n E(x|m)tr(DcB,mW⊗nB (x)) and
• eE(C,W⊗n) := 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n E(x|m)tr(DcE,m0W
⊗n
E (x)),
where,Wγ ,γ ∈ {B,E} are the marginal channels ofW . Moreover, we use the security criterion given by
I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n), (3)
where σs,n is the code state defined by
σs,n :=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
|m〉〈m| ⊗
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m)W⊗ns (x), (s ∈ S,n ∈N). (4)
The conditional mutual information should be understood given (2) and considering ONBs {|mi〉}mi∈[Mi ] ∈
C
Mi for i ∈ {0, c} and |m〉 := |m0〉 ⊗ |mc〉. Based on this, we define the following achievable rate pairs.
Definition 2. (Achievable BCC rate pair) A pair (R0,Rc) of non-negative numbers is called an achievable BCC
rate pair forW , if for each ǫ,δ > 0, exists an n0(ǫ,δ) ∈N, such that for all n > n0, we find an (n,M0,n ,Mc,n) BCC
code C = (E(·|m),DB,m,DE,m0 )m∈M such that
1. 1n logMi,n ≥ Ri − δ (i ∈ {0, c}),
2. sups∈S eγ (C,W⊗ns ) ≤ ǫ (γ ∈ {B,E}),
3. sups∈S I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n) ≤ ǫ,
are simultaneously fulfilled.
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We define the BCC capacity region ofW by
CBCC [W ] := {(R0,Rc) ∈R+0 ×R+0 : (R0,Rc) is achievable BCC rate pair forW}. (5)
To state our theorem, we define the following regions, given finite alphabets U ,Y and probability distri-
bution p = pUYX ∈ P (U ×Y ×X n), with the random variables U,Y ,X distributed accordingly.
Cˆ(1)
(
W ,p,n
)
:=
{
(R0,Rc) ∈ R+0 ×R+0 : R0 ≤ inf
s∈S
min {I(U ;B,ωs), I(U ;E,ωs )}∧
Rc ≤ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|U,ωs)− sup
s∈S
I(Y ;E|U,ωs)
}
.
with
ωs :=
∑
(u,y,x)∈U×Y×X n
p(u,y,x) |u〉 〈u| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗W⊗ns (x). (6)
We state the following theorem.
Theorem 3. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE) be any compound cqq broadcast channel. It holds
CBCC [W ] = cl
( ∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)
(
W ,p, l
))
, (7)
where we have used 1l A := {(1l x1, 1l x2) : (x1,x2) ∈ A}. The second union is taken over all pUYX ∈ P (U ×Y ×X l )
such that random variable U −Y −X form a Markov chain and alphabets U and Y are finite.
Remark 4. The set given on the right hand side of (7) is convex and hence we do not need further convexification
here. This results from time sharing arguments applied on the entropic quantities appearing in (7). For a short
proof of a similar statement, see [17].
We proceed with the TPC scenario. The precise definition of the TPC codes is given in the following.
Definition 5 ( TPC codes). An (n,M1,n ,Mc,n) TPC code for W , is a family C = (E(·|m),DB,m)m∈M with M :=
[M1,n]× [Mc,n], stochastic encoder E :M→P (X n) and a POVM (DB,m)m∈M on H⊗nB .
We define the relevant transmission error function, for any cqq broadcast channelW : X → S (HB⊗HE)
and n ∈N by
eB(C,W⊗n) := 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m)tr(DcB,mW⊗nB (x)).
Moreover, we use the security criterion given by
I(Mc ;E|M1,σs,n), (8)
where σs,n is the code state defined by
σs,n :=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
|m〉〈m| ⊗
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m)W⊗ns (x). (9)
Again, we not that the conditional mutual information should be understood given (2) and considering
ONBs {|mi〉}mi∈[Mi ] ∈ CMi for i ∈ {1, c} and |m〉 := |m1〉 ⊗ |mc〉. Based on this, we define the following achiev-
able rate pairs.
Definition 6. (Achievable TPC rate pair) A pair (R1,Rc) of non-negative numbers is called an achievable TPC
rate pair forW , if for each ǫ,δ > 0, exists an n0(ǫ,δ) ∈N, such that for all n > n0, we find an (n,M1,n ,Mc,n) TPC
code C = (E(·|m),DB,m)m∈M such that
1. 1n logMi,n ≥ Ri − δ ( i ∈ {1, c}),
2. sups∈S eB(C,W⊗ns ) ≤ ǫ,
3. sups∈S I(Mc ;E|M1,σs,n) ≤ ǫ
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are simultaneously fulfilled.
We define the TPC capacity region ofW by
CTPC [W ] := {(R1,Rc) ∈R+0 ×R+0 : (R1,Rc) is achievable TPC rate forW}. (10)
To state our theorem, we define the following sub-regions, given finite alphabets V ,Y and probability
distribution p = pVYX ∈ P (V ×Y ×X n), with the random variables V ,Y ,X distributed accordingly.
C(1)
(
W ,p,n
)
:=
{
(R1,Rc) ∈R+0 ×R+0 : R1 ≤ inf
s∈S
I(V ;B,ωs)∧
Rc ≤ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|V ,ωs)− sup
s∈S
I(Y ;E|V ,ωs)
}
.
with
ωs :=
∑
(v,y,x)∈V×X×X
p(v,y,x) |v〉〈v| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗W⊗ns (x). (11)
We can state the following theorem.
Theorem 7. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE) be any compound cqq broadcast channel. It holds
CTPC [W ] = cl
( ∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
C(1)
(
W ,p, l
))
. (12)
The second union is taken over all pVYX ∈ P (V × Y × X l ) such that random variable V − Y −X form a Markov
chain and alphabets V and Y are finite.
Again, we note Remark 4, regarding convexity of the set on the right hand side of (12).
5 Coding for broadcast channel
In this section we present coding strategies for BCC and TPC communication scenarios sufficient to achieve
each point in the capacity region. We prove appropriate inner bounds on the capacity regions, namely the
direct parts of the main theorems presented in the previous section. Here, we begin by some preliminary
results, in the statements of which, wemake use of typical sets and projections. The use of these objects are
standard in classical as well as quantum information theory. The reader will find detailed explanations in
[19]. We begin this section nevertheless, by introducing these objects. Given two probability distributions
p ∈ P (X¯ ) and ∀x ∈ X¯ , t(·|x) ∈ P (Y¯ ), n ∈N, δ > 0, we define the following sets. The set of δ-typical sequences
in X¯ n, is defined by
T np,δ := {x : ∀x ∈ X¯ , |
1
n
N (x|x)− p(x)| ≤ δ ∧ q(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ N (x|x) = 0} (13)
with N (x|x), the number of occurrences of letter x in word x. Also, the set of conditionally typical se-
quences in Y¯n, is given by
Tt,δ(x) : = {y ∈ Y¯n : ∀x ∈ X¯ ,y ∈ Y¯ : |1nN (x,y|x,y)−
1
n
t(y|x)N (x|x)| ≤ δ and
t(y|x) = 0 ⇐⇒ N (x,y|x,y) = 0 for x ∈ X¯ ,y ∈ Y¯ }.
The pruned distributions associated with p and t(·|x) are given by the following respectively.
p′n,δ(x) :=

p⊗n(x)
p⊗n(T np,δ)
, if x ∈ T np,δ
0, otherwise,
(14)
and
t′n,δ(y|x) :=

t⊗n(y|x)
t⊗n(Tt,δ(x)|x) , if y ∈ Tt,δ(x)
0, otherwise.
(15)
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For the remainder of this section, pruned distributions defined above, will be denoted by primed letters
indicating the probability distribution, indexed by the number of available copies of the system. For
instance the pruned probability distribution related to r ∈ P (X ), over T nr,δ will be denoted by r ′n,δ . In (13),
when δ = 0, we have the exact type notified by T np . We also define the set of types by
T (X¯ ,n) := {λ ∈ P (X¯ ) : T nλ , ∅}. (16)
The following lemma contains the properties typical projections, that projection operators assigned to
typical sets.
Lemma 8. Let λ ∈ P (A) with λ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ A ⊂ X , {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S (KA) and δ > 0. For x ∈ T nλ,δ with
x := (x1, . . . ,xn) and ρx :=
⊗n
i=1 ρxi . Define
θ :=
∑
x∈X
λ(x) |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx.
There exist positive constants Υ(δ),Γ(δ) and ∆(δ) depending on δ and an orthogonal projector Πρx,δ such that
1. tr(ρxΠρx,δ) ≥ 1− 2−nΥ(δ),
2. tr(Πρx,δ) ≤ 2n(S(A|X,θ)+∆(δ)),
3. Πρx,δρxΠρx,δ ≤ 2−n(S(A|X,θ)+Γ(δ))Πρx,δ,
Also, letW : Y → S (KB) be a cq channel and r(·|x) ∈ P (Y ), for all x ∈ X . Define the state
θ′ :=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
λ(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ r(y|x) |y〉〈y| ⊗W (y).
For y ∈ Tr,δ(x), there exist positive constants Υ′(δ),∆′(δ),Γ′(δ) and an orthogonal projector ΠW,x,δ(y),
commuting withW⊗n(y), satisfying
4. tr[W⊗n(y)ΠW,x,δ(y)] ≥ 1− 2−nΥ′(δ),
5. tr[ΠW,x,δ(y)] ≤ 2n(S(B|XY,θ)+∆′(δ)),
6. ΠW,x,δ(y)W
⊗n(y)ΠW,x,δ(y) ≤ 2−n(S(B|XY,θ′)+Γ′(δ))ΠW,x,δ(y).
Finally, we have the following total conditional subspace projection. For ρx =
∑
y∈Y r(y|x)W (y), the projection
ΠW,x,δ :=Πρx,δ with properties 1-3, for y ∈ Tr,δ(x) also has the following property.
tr(ΠW,x,δW
⊗n(y)) ≥ 1− 2−nΥ”(δ), (17)
for some constant Υ”(δ) > 0 depending on δ.
Proof. Properties 1-3 result directly from Lemma 14 [17]. Properties 4-6 and (17), result from applying
the same concatenation arguments as in the proof of Lemma 14 [17], on inequalities (4)-(7) from [18].
A crucial ingredient for the achievablity proofs in this paper is Lemma 9 below. It states existence of
certain universal random codes for cq channels given a "typical word".
Lemma 9. Let {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(Y ,KB) be any set of cq channels, q ∈ P (X ) and r(·|x) ∈ P (Y ) for each x ∈ X .
For δ > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N, such that for n > n0, for each x ∈ T nq,δ , there exists a map y : (y1, . . . ,yM ) 7→
(Λ1(y) . . . ,ΛM (y)), such that (Λm(y))m∈[M] ⊂ L(K⊗nB ) is a POVM and for any family Y := (Y1, . . . ,YM ) of random
variables, distributed i.i.d according to r ′n,δ(·|x), namely the pruned distribution of r(·|x) (see (15)), we have
EY
[
sup
s∈S
1
M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W⊗ns (Ym)Λcm(Y ))
]
≤ ǫn
with ǫn → 0 exponentially and
1
n
logM ≥ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|X,σs)− cδ,
with some constant c > 0 and
σs :=
∑
x∈X
q(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗
∑
y∈Y
r(y|x) |y〉〈y| ⊗Ws(y).
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Proof. We present a full argument in Appendix B.
The following statement is an immediate consequence of the above, for the case |X | = 1. We include
this statement for clarity of reference later on.
Lemma 10. Let {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(Y ,KB) be any set of cq channels and r ∈ P (Y ). For δ > 0, there exists n0, such
that for n > n0, there exists a map y : (y1, . . . ,yM ) 7→ (Λ1(y), . . . ,ΛM (y)), such that (Λm(y))m∈[M] is a POVM
and for any family Y := (Y1, . . . ,YM ) of random variables, distributed i.i.d according to r
′
n,δ, namely the pruned
distribution of r (see (14)), we have
EY
[
sup
s∈S
1
M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W⊗ns (Ym)Λcm(Y ))
]
≤ ǫn,
with ǫn → 0 exponentially and
1
n
logM ≥ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B,σs)− cδ
for some constant c > 0 and
σs :=
∑
y∈Y
r(y) |y〉 〈y| ⊗Ws(y).
In Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, we show that the above statements give us the desired codes for trans-
mission of public and common messages. These statements generalize the coding results from [24] to
include pruned input distributions rather than distributions of n-fold product form.
Finally, to obtain codes for transmission of confidential messages, we perform privacy amplification argu-
ments on the public part of the codebook achieved from Lemma 9 (cf.[14]). To do so, we need the following
inequality.
Theorem 11 ([9], Theorem 19). Let µ > 0, ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ) be positive numbers and X1, . . . ,XL an independent and
identically distributed family of positive semi-definite random matrices on Cd such that the bounds X ≤ µ1
C
d
and EX ≥ ǫ1
C
d apply. It holds
Pr

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥1L
L∑
i=1
Xi −EX
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
> ǫ
 ≤ 2 · d · exp
(
−L ǫ
3
2dµ ln2
)
Equipped with these preliminary results, we prove the direct parts of the capacity theorems for BCC
and TPC in the following two subsections.
5.1 BCC codes
In this section, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 12. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE) be any compound cqq broadcast channel. It holds
CBCC [W ] ⊃ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)
(
W ,p, l
) ,
where the second union is taken over all pUYX ∈ P (U × Y × X l ) such that random variable U − Y −X form a
Markov chain and alphabets U and Y are finite.
The main step towards proving Lemma 12, is the following statement.
Lemma 13 (Broadcast channel with confidential messages ). LetW := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB⊗HE) be any com-
pound cqq broadcast channel. For pUYX ∈ P (U×Y×X )whereU−Y−X form aMarkov chain and δ,ǫ > 0, there ex-
ists n0 ∈N, such that for n > n0, we find an (n,M0,n ,Mc,n) BCC code C = (E(·|m),DB,m ,DE,m0 )m=(m0,mc)∈[M0,n]×[Mc,n]
with
1. 1n logM0,n ≥ infs∈Smin {I(U ;B,ωs , I(U ;E,ωs } − cδ,
2. 1n logMc,n ≥ infs∈S I(Y ;B|U,ωs)− sups∈S I(Y ;E|U,ωs)− cδ
with some constant c > 0 and ωs defined by (6).
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3. infs∈S 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n E(x|m)tr[W⊗nB,s (x)DB,m] ≥ 1− ǫ
4. infs∈S 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n E(x|m)tr[W⊗nE,s (x)DE,m0 ] ≥ 1− ǫ
5. sups∈S I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n) ≤ ǫ
with state σs,n defined by (4).
Applying standard double-blocking arguments on Lemma 13, will prove Lemma 12. In the same vein
as the coding steps taken in [27], we prove Lemma 13 in two steps. At first, we prove the following
random coding result, that guarantees reliable decoding of commonmessages by Bob and Eve, and reliable
decoding of public messages by Bob. Here, we do not concern ourselves with the security condition. In
the next step, we apply privacy amplification arguments on the public part of the codebook, to achieve the
desired confidential message transmission rate.
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Lemma 14. Let W := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(Y ,HB ⊗HE) be any compound cqq broadcast channel and U be a finite
alphabet. For any δ > 0, q ∈ P (U ), r(·|u) ∈ P (Y ), u ∈ U and large enough values of n, the following exist.
• A family (um,DE,m)m∈[M0,n] of codes with um ∈ T nq,δ and (DE,m)m∈[M0,n] ⊂ L(H⊗nE ) a POVM.
• A map y : (yij )(i,j)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n] 7→ (DB,ij (y))(i,j)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n], such that (DB,ij (y))(i,j)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n] ∈ L(H⊗nB ) is
a POVM and for any family Y = (Yij )(i,j)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n] of random variables such that for each m ∈ [M0,n],
Ym = (Ymj )j∈[M1,n] is distributed i.i.d according to r
′
n(·|um), namely the pruned distribution of r(·|u) (see
(15)), we have
1
n
logM0,n ≥ inf
s∈S
min {I(U ;B,ωs), I(U ;E,ωs )} − cδ,
1
n
logM1,n ≥ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|U,ωs)− cδ,
EY
[
inf
s∈S
1
M0,nM1,n
∑
(m,i)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n]
tr[W⊗nB,s (Ymi )DB,mi (Y )]
]
≥ 1− ǫn,
EY
[
inf
s∈S
1
M0,nM1,n
∑
(m,i)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n]
tr[W⊗nE,s (Ymi )DE,m]
]
≥ 1− ǫn
with ǫn → 0 exponentially, constant c > 0 and ωs =
∑
u∈U q(u) |u〉 〈u| ⊗ r(y|u) |y〉〈y| ⊗Ws(y).
Proof. We approximate {Ws}s∈S by a finite τn-net {Ws}s∈Sn ⊂ {Ws}s∈S with τn := 2−
nν
2 with a constant posi-
tive number ν to be determined later. We choose the net small enough to have log |Sn| ≤ 2 · |X | ·dim(HB ⊗
HE )2(log6 + nν/2) which is possible by Lemma 30. For γ ∈ {B,E} and s ∈ Sn, consider the effective chan-
nel Wˆγ,s,n : U n → S (H⊗nγ ) defined by Wˆγ,s(·) :=
∑
y∈Y r(y|·)Wγ,s(y). Applying Lemma 10 on the chan-
nel set {Wˆγ,s}s∈Sn and probability distribution q, yields the existence of the random (n,M0,n) code C(U )
with U = (U1, . . . ,UM0,n ), a sequence of i.i.d random variables distributed according to q
′
n,δ and POVMs
(Dγ,m(U ))m∈[M0,n] ⊂ L(H⊗nγ ) such that
EU
[
min
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
m∈[M0,n]
tr(Dγ,m(U )Wˆ
⊗n
γ,s (Um))
]
≥ 1− ǫ0,n. (18)
with ǫ0,n → 0 exponentially and
1
n
logM0,n ≥min
s∈Sn
I(U ;γ,ωs)− c0δ.
Hence we have
1
n
logM0,n ≥min
s∈Sn
min {I(U ;B,ωs), I(U ;E,ωs)} − c0δ.
Given (18), we can conclude the existence of one realization (u1, . . . ,uM0,n ) of random variable U , and
POVMs (Dγ,m)m∈[M0,m] ∈ L(H⊗nγ ), suitable for transmission of common messages, namely
min
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
m∈[M0,n]
tr(Dγ,mWˆ
⊗n
γ,s (um)) ≥ 1− ǫ0,n. (19)
Before moving on to the private message, notice that for each u ∈ T nq,δ , using the abbreviation Tδ :=
r⊗n(Tr,δ(u)), we have
‖Wˆ⊗nγ,s (u)−
∑
y∈Yn
r ′n(y|u)W⊗nγ,s (y)‖1 ≤
∑
y∈Tr,δ (u)
r⊗n(y|u)( 1
Tδ
− 1)‖W⊗nγ,s (y)‖1
+
∑
y∈T cr,δ(u)
r⊗n(y|u)‖W⊗nγ,s (y)‖1 ≤ 2(1−Tδ) ≤ 2 · 2−nδ. (20)
The upper bound above comes from the fact that Tδ approaches unity exponentially with n (cf. [19]). Now
we pursue with the private message, namely the one Bob has to decode while Eve may or may not. For
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each umˆ, mˆ ∈ [M0,n] obtained above, apply Lemma 9 on {Ws}Sn and probability distribution r(·|u), u ∈ U .
on Lemma 9, we obtain the existence of a random code C(Yumˆ ) with Yumˆ = (Ymˆ,1, . . . ,Ymˆ,M1,n ) and decoding
operation (Λm(Y
umˆ ))m∈[M1,n], such that Y
umˆ is distributed according to r ′n,δ(·|umˆ)⊗M1,n with
EYumˆ
[
inf
s∈Sn
1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(Λm(Y
umˆ )W⊗nB,s (Ymˆ,m))
]
≥ 1− ǫ1,n, (21)
and
1
n
logM1,n ≥ I(Y ;B|U,ωs)− c1δ.
We have
min
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
EYumˆ
[ 1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(Dγ,mˆW
⊗n
s,γ (Ymˆ,m))
]
=min
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
(tr(Dγ,mˆ
∑
y∈Yn
r ′n,δ(y|umˆ)W⊗ns,γ (y)))
= min
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
tr(Dγ,mˆWˆ
⊗n
γ,s (umˆ))− 2 · 2−nδ ≥ 1− ǫ2,n. (22)
where in the first equality, we have calculated the expectation value given that for each mˆ ∈ [M0,n],
Pr(Ymˆ,m = y) = r
′
n(y|umˆ),∀m ∈ [M0,n], and in the last line, we have observed (20) and inserted (19), set-
ting ǫ2,n := ǫ0,n +2 ·2−nδ. Consider the random decoding operation (DB,mˆ,m(Y ))(mˆ,m)∈[M0,n]×[M1,n] defined for
each message pair by DB,mˆ,m(Y ) :=
√
DB,mˆΛm(Y
umˆ )
√
DB,mˆ. We have
EY
[ 1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(DB,mˆ,m(Y )W
⊗n
B,s (Ymˆ,m))
]
=
1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
EYumˆ
[ 1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(
√
DB,mˆΛm(Y
umˆ )
√
DB,mˆW
⊗n
B,s (Ymˆ,m))
]
≥
1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
1
M0,n
∑
mˆ∈[M0,n]
(
EYumˆ
[ 1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(Λm(Y
umˆ )W⊗nB,s (Ymˆ,m))
]
−
2
√
1−E
[ 1
M1,n
∑
m∈[M1,n]
tr(DB,mˆW
⊗n
B,s (Ymˆ,m))
])
≥ 1− ǫ1,n − 2√ǫ2,n, (23)
where in the first inequality, we have used Lemma 24, and in the last line, we have inserted the lower
bounds from (22) and (21) and used concavity of the square root function. Applying standard net approx-
imation techniques used for example in proof of Lemma 9, we obtain the claim of the lemma.
At this point we can prove Lemma 13, by applying privacy amplification arguments (c.f [14]) on the
M1 part of the messages obtained in Lemma 14. This is done by using equidistribution when inputting
part of these messages to confuse the eavesdropper. The other part ofM1 will then be secure.
Proof of Lemma 13. Let pUYX(u,y,x) = pUY (u,y)pX |Y (x|y) and pUY (u,y) = q(u)r(y|u) ∀(u,y,x) ∈ U × Y × X .
We approximate {Ws}s∈S by a finite τn-net {Ws}Sn ⊂ {Ws}s∈S with τn := 2−
nν
2 with a constant positive number
ν to be determined later. We choose the net small enough to fulfill the cardinality bound log |Sn| ≤ 2 ·
|X | · dim(HB ⊗HE)2(log6+ nν/2) which is possible by Lemma 30. Let δ > 0, n ∈N and pruned probability
distributions q′n,δ, r
′
n(·|u) over T nq,δ and Tr,δ(u), (u ∈ U n) be given. Set
M0,n = ⌊2n
(
mins∈Sn min{I (U ;B,ωs),I (U ;E,ωs)}−cδ
)
⌋, (24)
Jn = ⌊2n
(
mins∈Sn I (Y ;B|U,ωs )−maxs∈Sn I (Y ;E|U,ωs )−2∆(δ)−cδ
)
⌋ (25)
and
Ln = ⌈2nmaxs∈Sn I (Y ;E|U,ωs)+n∆(δ)⌉. (26)
11
For the effective channel W˜s : Y → S (HB ⊗HE ) defined by W˜s(·) :=
∑
x∈X pX |Y (x|·)Ws(x),∀s ∈ S, according to
Lemma 14, there exists a family (um,DE,m)m∈[M0,n] and a random familyC(Y ) = (Ymjl ,DB,mjl (Y ))(m,j,l)∈[M0,n]×[Jn]×[Ln], such that for events
A :=
{
max
s∈Sn
1
M0,nJnLn
∑
m,j,l
tr(W˜⊗nB,s (Ymjl )D
c
B,mji (Y )) ≥
√
ǫn
}
and
B :=
{
max
s∈Sn
1
M0,nJnLn
∑
m,j,l
tr(W˜⊗nE,s (Ymjl )D
c
E,m) ≥
√
ǫn
}
, (27)
we have
Pr[A∪B] ≤ 2√ǫn, (28)
where we have used the Markov inequality to obtain the above probability from the expectation value of
the same event, and applied the union bound to get the probability of the complementary events (one
with respect to W˜B,s and the other with respect to W˜E,s). Here, ǫn goes to zero exponentially, given the
appropriate choice of τn, as evident in the proof of Lemma 9. We define the following quantities for each
s ∈ Sn and u ∈ T nq,δ .
Qus (y) :=ΠW˜E,s ,u,δΠW˜E,s ,u,δ(y)W˜
⊗n
E,s (y)ΠW˜E,s ,u,δ(y)ΠW˜E,s ,u,δ (29)
with quantities defied in Lemma 8 and
Θ
u
s :=
∑
yn∈Yn
r ′n,δ(y|u)Qus (y). (30)
Given property 4 of Lemma 8, (17) and Lemma 22, we have ∀u ∈ U n,y ∈ Tr,δ(u) and s ∈ Sn
‖ W˜⊗nE,s (y)−Qus (y) ‖1≤
√
2−nΥ(δ)+1 +
√
2−nΥ′′(δ)+2 := ǫ1,n. (31)
Clearly ǫ1,n → 0 exponentially. Applying Theorem 11 with Cd the range space of projection ΠW˜E,s ,u,δ, by
property 2 of Lemma 8 we have
d ≤ 2S(E|U,ω⊗ns )+n∆(δ) (32)
Furthermore, from the property 6 of the projections introduced in Lemma8, we have for all u ∈ T nq,δ
Qus (Ymjl ) ≤ 2−S(E|YU,ω
⊗n
s )+nΓ
′(δ)
1Cd . (33)
Let n > 2. The hypotheses of Theorem 11 are therefore satisfied with ǫ = ǫ0,n := 2
−nΓ′(δ)/6 and µ =
2−S(E|YU,ω
⊗n
s )+nΓ
′(δ). Since um ∈ T nq,δ ,∀m ∈ [M0,n], for the event
Cs,m,j :=

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Q
um
s (Ymjl )−Θums
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
> ǫ0,n
 ,
we have
Pr
[
Cs,m,j
]
≤ 2S(E|U,ω⊗ns )+n∆(δ) × exp
(
− Ln
ǫ30,n
2ln2 · 2S(E|U,ω⊗ns )−S(E|YU,ω⊗ns )+n(∆(δ)−Γ′(δ))
)
≤ 2n(logdimHE+∆(δ)) × exp
(
− Ln
ǫ30,n
2ln2 · 2I (Y ;E|U,ω⊗ns )+n(∆(δ)−Γ′(δ))
)
.
Applying the union bound, for all s ∈ Sn, j ∈ Jn,m ∈ [M0,n] we have
Pr
[
C :=
⋃
s,j,m
Cs,m,j
]
≤ JnM0,n |Sn|2n(logdimHE+∆(δ)) × exp
(
− Ln
ǫ30,n
2ln2 · 2I (Y ;E|U,ω⊗ns )+n(∆(δ)−Γ′(δ))
)
. (34)
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From (28) and (34), we have
Pr
[
C∪B∪A
]
≤ 2√ǫn + JnM0,n × |Sn|2n(logdimHE+∆(δ))
× exp
(
− Ln
ǫ30,n
2ln2 · 2I (Y ;E|U,ω⊗ns )+n(∆(δ)−Γ′(δ))
)
. (35)
Finally, given (26), we have
exp
(
− Ln
ǫ30,n
2ln2 · 2I (Y ;E|U,ω⊗ns )+n(∆(δ)−Γ′(δ))
)
≤ exp
(
− ǫ
3
0,n2
nΓ′(δ)
2ln2·
)
, (36)
which gives us a double exponential decay given that ǫ0,n = 2
−nΓ′(δ)/6. Inserting (36) in (35), we conclude
that we can find one realization {ymjl }(m,j,l)∈[M0,n]×[Jn]×[Ln] of Y , such that
min
s∈Sn
1
M0,nJnLn
∑
m,j,l
tr(W˜⊗nB,s (ymjl )DB,mjl ) ≥ 1−
√
ǫn, (37)
min
s∈Sn
1
M0,nJnLn
∑
m,j,l
tr(W˜⊗nE,s (ymjl )DE,m) ≥ 1−
√
ǫn (38)
and
max
s∈Sn
max
m,j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Q
um
s (ymjl )−Θums
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ0,n. (39)
Consider the stochastic encoder E(·|m,j) := 1Ln
∑
l∈[Ln] p
n
X |Y (·|ymjl ) and POVM (DB,mj :=
∑
l∈[Ln]Dmjl )m,j . There-
fore withMc,n = Jn, we have
inf
s∈S
1
M0,nMc,n
∑
m0∈[M0],mc∈[Mc,n]
tr(
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m0,mc)W⊗nB,s (x)DB,m0 ,mc )
=
1
M0,nMc,n
∑
m0,mc
tr(
1
Ln
∑
x∈X n
∑
l∈[Ln]
pnX |Y (·|ym0mc l )W⊗nB,s (x)
∑
l ′∈[Ln]
DB,m0mc l ′ )
≥ 1−√ǫn − 2nτn, (40)
where in the last line we have inserted the bound from (37) and observed that the error due to {Ws}s∈Sn can
only be 2nτn less than the error due toW . By the same line of reasoning we have
inf
s∈S
1
M0,nMc,n
∑
m0∈[M0],mc∈[Mc,n]
tr(
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m0,mc)W⊗nE,s (x)DE,m0 )
=
1
M0,nMc,n
∑
m0,mc
tr(
1
Ln
∑
x∈X n
∑
l∈[Ln]
pnX |Y (·|ym0mc l )W⊗nE,s (x)
∑
l ′∈[Ln]
DE,m0 )
≥ 1−√ǫn − 2nτn. (41)
The 5th claim in the statement of the lemma related to the security criterion requires upper bounding
sups∈S I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n) for all s ∈ Sn, that is done in the following. First we observe that for all s ∈ S
I(Mc;E|M0,σs,n) = 1M0,n
∑
m0∈[M0,n]
I(Mc;E,σ
m0
s,n ), (42)
with
σ
m0
s,n :=
1
Mc,n
∑
mc∈[Mc,n]
⊗
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m0,mc)W⊗n(x).
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We continue upper-bounding the mutual information on the right hands side of (42) for each m0 ∈ [M0,n].
We note that for all s ∈ Sn
I(Mc ;E,σ
m0
s,n ) = S
(
1
Mc,n
∑
mc∈[Mc,n]
∑
x∈X n
E(x|m0,mc)W⊗nE,s (x)
)
− 1
Mc,n
∑
mc∈[Mc,n]
S
( ∑
x∈X n
E(x|m0,mc)W⊗nE,s (x)
)
= S
(
1
Mc,nLn
∑
j∈[Mc,n],l∈[Ln]
W˜⊗nE,s (ym0jl )
)
− 1
Mc,n
∑
mc∈[Mc,n]
S
( ∑
l∈[Ln]
W˜⊗nE,s (ym0jl )
)
(43)
Notice that, given (31) and (39) and the triangle inequality we have for all s ∈ Sn
‖
∑
l∈[Ln]
W˜⊗nE,s (ym0jl )−Θ
um0
s ‖1≤ ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n. (44)
Applying Lemma 25 with δ = ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n, given (44) and (43) we obtain
I(Mc ;E,σ
m0
s,n ) ≤ 2(n(ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n) logdim(HE ) + h(ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n)) . (45)
Inserting this into (42), we obtain the same upper bound on the conditional mutual information quantity
on the left hand side for all s ∈ Sn. Given properties of the τ-net (Lemma 30), applying Lemma 26 with
δ = 2nτn we obtain
sup
s∈S
I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n) ≤max
s∈Sn
I(Mc;E|M0,σs,n) + 2
(
2n2τn logdim(HB) + (1 + 2nτn)h(2nτn/1+2nτn)
)
≤ 2(n(ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n) logdim(HE ) + h(ǫ0,n + ǫ1,n))
+2
(
2n2τn logdim(HB) + (1 + 2nτn)h(2nτn/1+2nτn)
)
. (46)
Given the upper bound on Sn, choosing ν =
1
8n|X |dim(HB⊗HE ) logǫn, we obtain exponential decay of the right
hand sides of (40) and (41). Also, with this value of τn and choosing large enough values of n, (46) gives us
the 5th claim of the statement.
Proof of Lemma 12. According to Lemma 13,
(R0,Rc) ∈
⋃
p
Cˆ(1)
(
J ,p,1
)
implies (R1,Rc) ∈ CBCC (J ). Using standard double-blocking and time sharing arguments, for each l ∈N,
(R0,Rc) ∈ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)
(
J ,p, l
) ,
implies (R0,Rc) ∈ CBCC (J ).
Here, in order to construct private codes for the broadcast channel, we first generated suitable ran-
dom message transmission codes for the broadcast channel without imposing privacy constraints (Lemma
14). This was done by establishing suitable bounds for random universal "superposition codes". Subse-
quent application of a covering principle these codes where transformed to fulfill the security criterion in
Lemma 13. Beside technical obstacles to construct superposition codes for cq broadcast channels which
are robust regarding uncertainty of the channel state, the approach is rather traditional and even dates
back to classical information theory (see e.g. [19] for a general discussion, the classical counterpart to our
considerations can be found in [27]).
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5.2 TPC codes
In this section, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 15. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE) be any compound cqq broadcast channel. It holds
CTPC [W ] ⊃ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
C(1)
(
W ,p, l
) ,
where the second union is taken over all pVYX ∈ P (V × Y × X l ) such that random variable V − Y − X form a
Markov chain and alphabets V and Y are finite.
The main step towards proving Lemma 15, is the following statement.
Lemma 16 (Broadcast channel with confidential messages ). Let W := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE ) be any
compound cqq broadcast channel. For pVYX ∈ P (V×Y×X )whereV−Y−X form aMarkov chain and δ,ǫ > 0, there
exists n0 ∈N, such that for n > n0, we find an (n,M1,n ,Mc,n) TPC code {E(·|m),DB,m,DE,m1 }m=(m1,mc)∈[M1,n]×[Mc,n]
with
1. 1n logM1,n ≥ infs∈S I(V ;B,ωs)− cδ,
2. 1n logMc,n ≥ infs∈S I(Y ;B|V ,ωs)− sups∈S I(Y ;E|V ,ωs)− cδ
with some constants c > 0 and ωs defined by (6).
3. infs∈S 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X n E(x|m)tr[W⊗nB,s (x)DB,m] ≥ 1− ǫ
4. sups∈S I(Mc ;E|M1,σs,n) ≤ ǫ
with state σs,n defined by (4).
Applying standard double-blocking arguments on Lemma 16, will prove Lemma 15. We prove Lemma
16 in two steps. At first, we prove the following random coding result, that guarantees reliable decoding
of public messages by Bob and Eve, and reliable decoding of public messages by Bob. In the next step,
we apply privacy amplification arguments on the public part of the codebook, to achieve the desired
confidential message transmission rate.
Lemma 17. Let W := {Ws}s∈S ⊂ CQ(Y ,HB ⊗HE ) be any compound cqq broadcast channel and V be a finite
alphabet. For any δ > 0, q ∈ P (V ), r(·|v) ∈ P (Y ), v ∈ V and large enough values of n, the following exist.
• A family (vm)m∈[M2,n] of words with vm ∈ T nq,δ .
• A map y : (yij )(i,j)∈[M1,n]×[M2,n] 7→ (DB,ij (y))(i,j)∈[M1,n]×[M2,n], such that (DB,ij (y))(i,j)∈[M1,n]×[M2,n] ∈ L(H⊗nB ) is
a POVM and for any family Y = (Yij )(i,j)∈[M1,n]×[M2,n] of random variables such that for each m ∈ [M1,n],
Ym = (Ymj )j∈[M2,n] is distributed i.i.d according to r
′(·|vm) we have
1
n
logM1,n ≥ inf
s∈S
I(V ;B,ωs)− cδ,
1
n
logM2,n ≥ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|V ,ωs)− cδ,
EY
[
inf
s∈S
1
M1,nM2,n
∑
(m,i)∈[M1,n]×[M2,n]
tr(W⊗nB,s (Ymi )DB,mi (Y )
]
≥ 1− ǫn,
with ǫn → 0 exponentially, constant c > 0 and ωs =
∑
v∈V q(u) |v〉〈v| ⊗ r(y|v) |y〉〈y| ⊗Ws(y).
Proof. The proof is done by following exactly the lines in proof of Lemma14, except that here γ = {B}.
Proof of Lemma 16. The proof follows by applying the privacy amplification arguments in the proof of
Lemma 13, on [M2,n] part of the messages in Lemma 17. It is clear that here, we only consider upper
bounding the probability of events corresponding to events A and C in the proof of that Lemma 13, and
drop (27).
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Proof of Lemma 15. According to Lemma 16,
(R1,Rc) ∈
⋃
p
C(1)
(
J ,p,1
)
implies (R1,Rc) ∈ CTPC(J ). Using standard double-blocking and time sharing arguments, for each l ∈N,
(R1,Rc) ∈ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
C(1)
(
J ,p, l
) ,
implies (R1,Rc) ∈ CTPC(J ).
6 Outer bounds for the capacity regions
In this section, we consider the "converse" bounds stated in Theorem 3 and Theorem 7. The arguments of
proof turn out to be fairly standard. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to providing proof details regarding
the outer bound to the BCC capacity regions from Theorem 3.
Proposition 18. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ,Ws : X →S (HB ⊗HE), (s ∈ S) be a set of cqq channels. It holds
CBCC [W ] ⊂ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)(W ,p, l)
 .
The second union is taken over all pUYX ∈ P (U ×Y ×X l ) such that random variable U − Y −X form a Markov
chain and alphabets U and Y are finite.
Proof. Let (Cn)n∈N be a sequence of (n,M1,n ,Mc,n) BCC codes for W such that with a sequence en → 0,
(n→∞) for all s ∈ S eB(Cn,W⊗ns ), eE(Cn,W⊗ns ) and I(Mc,n ;En |M0,n,σs,n) are simultaneously upper-bounded
by en. While we fix the blocklength for a moment (and suppress the index n), we consider for each s ∈ S
the quadruple (M0,Mc ,M
(s)
0 ,M
(s)
c ) of random variables, where M
(s)
0 ,M
(s)
c belong to the common and confi-
dential messages decoded by B after transmission with W⊗ns . Note, that Pr((M0,Mc) , (M
(s)
0 ,M
(s)
c )) ≤ ǫn is
true by assumption. It holds
logM0 = H(M0) = I(M0;M
(s)
0 ) +H(M0|M
(s)
0 ) ≤ I(M0;Bn,σs,n) + ǫn · logM0. (47)
The second of the above equalities is the chain rule for the mutual information. The last inequality stems
from application of Fano’s lemma and the Holevo bound. A similar calculation for the second receiver
leads us to the inequality
logM0 ≤ I(M0;En,σs,n) + ǫn · logM0. (48)
Maximizing over all s ∈ S in (47) and (48) and combining the resulting inequalities gives the bound
logM0 ≤ min
{
sup
s∈S
I(M0;B
n,σs,n), sup
s∈S
I(M0;E
n,σs,n)
}
+ ǫn logM0.
In order to derive a bound onMc, we notice the inequality
logM0 ·Mc ≤ I(M0Mc;Bn,σs,n) + ǫn · logM0Mc . (49)
The chain rule for the quantum mutual information implies
I(M0Mc;B
n,σs,n)− logM0 ≤ I(M0Mc;Bn,σs,n)− I(M0;Bn,σs,n) = I(Mc ;Bn|M0,σs,n).
Combining the above inequality with (49) and rearranging terms give us the inequality
logMc ≤ I(Mc ;Bn|M0,σs,n) + ǫn · logM0Mc.
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Maximizing both sides of the inequality and adding the nonnegative term ǫn − sups∈S I(Mc ;En|M0,σs,n) to
the right hand side of the result, we obtain
logMc ≤ sup
s∈S
I(Mc;B
n|M0,σs,n) − sup
s∈S
I(Mc;E
n |M0,σs,n) + ǫn(logM0 ·Mc +1). (50)
Let δ > 0 be arbitrary and n0 large enough for ǫn(logM0 ·Mc) ≤ δ to hold. It is clear, for each n > n0,
( 1n logM0,n,
1
n logMc,n) is contained in
⋃
l>n0
1
n
⋃
p
Cˆ(1)(W ,p,n)δ ⊂

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)(W ,p, l)

δ
, (51)
where Aδ is the δ-blowup of A for each δ > 0 and A ∈R+0 ×R+0 , i.e
Aδ := {y ∈R+0 ×R+0 : ∃x ∈ A :‖ x − y ‖≤ δ}.
Since δ was an arbitrary positive number, we are done.
Proposition 19. LetW := {Ws}s∈S ,Ws : X →S (HB ⊗HE), (s ∈ S) be a set of cqq channels. It holds
CTPC [W ] ⊂ cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
C(1)(W ,p, l)
 .
The second union is taken over all pVYX ∈ P (V × Y ×X l ) such that random variable V − Y −X form a
Markov chain and alphabets V and Y are finite.
Proof. The proof can be conducted following exactly the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 18,
and therefore is left to the reader. The only modification is, that there is no need for E to decode the
message M1 (opposed to the case ofM0 in the proof of Proposition 18). This leads to the bound
logM1 ≤ sup
s∈S
I(M0;B
n,σs,n) + ǫn logM1.
on the number public messages in the code.
7 BCC and TPC capacities of compound quantum broadcast channels
In this section we extend our results to the "full quantum" setting where the receivers input quantum sys-
tems to the channels, i.e. the transition maps of the channels are c.p.t.p. maps instead of cq channels.
Since the message transmission tasks we aim to perform are after all of a classical nature, the correspond-
ing coding theorems can be proven applying the results from earlier chapters.
Explicitely we apply the results of the preceding sections to derive codes for full quantum broadcast chan-
nels. For the remainder of this section, we fix an arbitrary set J := {Ns}s∈S , where
Ns : L(HA)→L(HB ⊗HE)
is a c.p.t.p. map for each s ∈ S. Traditionally, the c.p.t.p. map Ns is assumed to be an isometric channel,
namely a Stinespring isometry to a given channel connecting A and B. This way of defining the channel
is fairly justified, since it naturally equips E with the strongest abilities when attacking the confidential
transmission goals of the remaining parties. However, dropping this assumption on the channel does not
complicate any subsequent arguments.
In what follows, we consider the BCC scenario. Corresponding considerations regarding the TPC scenario
are easily extrapolated and are hence left to the reader.
Definition 20 (BCC codes). An (n,M0,Mc) BCC code for J for channels in C(HA,HB ⊗HE ) is a family C =
(V (m),DB,m,DE,m0 )m∈M withM := [M0]× [Mc], where (DB,m)m∈M and (DE,m0 )m0∈[M0] are POVMs on H⊗nB resp.
H⊗nE and V (m) is a state on H⊗nA for each m.
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The average transmission errors for the receivers B, and E with channel N : L(HA)→L(HB ⊗HE ) and
(n,M0,Mc)-code C are defined by
eB(C,N ⊗n) := 1|M|
∑
m∈M
trDcB,mN ⊗n(V (m)), and eE(C,N ⊗n) :=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
trDcE,m0N ⊗n(V (m)).
By replacing the code and errors the definitions of achievable rate pairs can be directly guessed from
Definition 2 (the notational ambiguity should cause no misunderstandings since the set J determines
whether the classical-quantum or quantum broadcast channel scenario are considered.) We denote the
corresponding BCC capacity region by CBCC [J ] . We moreover define Cˆ(1)(J ,p, l, (ρy )y∈Y ) the set of all
points in R2 which fulfill the inequalities
0 ≤ R0 ≤ inf
s∈S
min {I(U ;B,ωs), I(U ;E,ωs)} and
0 ≤ Rc ≤ inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|U,ωs) − inf
s∈S
I(Y ;E|U,ωs)
where we understand the entropic quantities above as being evaluated on the ccq state
ωs := ω(Ns,p, l) :=
∑
u∈U ,y∈Y
PUY (u,y) · |u,y〉〈u,y | ⊗N ⊗ls (ρy)
for each s ∈ S.
Theorem 21. It holds
CBCC [J ] = cl

∞⋃
l=1
⋃
p
1
l
Cˆ(1)(J ,p, l)

The second union is taken over all pUYX ∈ P (U × Y × X l ) such that random variable U − Y − X distributed
accordingly, form a Markov chain and alphabets U and Y are finite.
Proof. The proof of achievability is easily performed by referring to the corresponding result for ccq broad-
cast channels. Namely, if we fix l ∈N, probability distributions PU and PY |U and a family (ρy)y∈Y of quan-
tum states on H⊗nA we have
ω(Ns,p, l, (ρy )y∈Y ) =
∑
u∈U
∑
y∈Y
PU (u) ·PY |U (y|u) |u,y〉〈u,y| ⊗N ⊗ls (ρy) = ω(V˜s,p,1)
with an effective cqq channel with signals V˜s(y) := N ⊗ls (ρy), (y ∈ Y ). As a consequence, 1l Cˆ(1)(J ,p, l, (ρy )y∈Y ) =
1
l Cˆ
(1)({V˜s}s∈S ,p,1). We know from Theorem 3, that each point on the r.h.s. of the preceding inequality is
achievable. To prove the converse, we assume, that Cn := (DB,m,DE,m0 ,V (m))m∈M is an (n,M0,Mc)-code with
eB(Cn,N ⊗ns ), , eE(Cn,N ns ), and I(Mc ;E|M0,σs,n)
are simultaneously bounded by ǫn ∈ (0,1). Note, that the mutual information quantity above is evaluated
on the code state
σs,n :=
1
M
∑
m∈M
|m〉〈m| ⊗N ⊗ns (V (m)).
Using the above bounds and repeating the corresponding steps from the proof of Proposition 18, we obtain
the inequalities
logM0 ≤min
{
sup
s∈S
I(M0;B
n,σs,n), sup
s∈S
I(M0;E
n,σs,n)
}
+ ǫn logM0.
and logMc ≤ I(Mc ;Bn|M0,σs,n)+ǫn·logM0Mc The remaining steps directly carry over from the cqq converse.
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8 Concluding remarks and future work
To construct private codes for the broadcast channel, we first generated suitable random message trans-
mission codes for the broadcast channel without imposing privacy constraints (Lemma 14). This was done
by establishing suitable bounds for random universal "superposition codes". With subsequent application
of a covering principle, these codes were transformed to fulfill the security criterion in Lemma 13.
As a possible alternative technique to generate such codes, we mention the rather recent "position de-
coding" and "convex split" techniques [5, 6]. This approach proved to be powerful yet elegant and was
successfully applied to determine "one-shot capacities" or "second order rates" in several scenarios. How-
ever, these techniques need still to be further developed, to also be suitable when dealing with channel
uncertainties as in the scenarios considered in the present paper. A partial result in that directions is
[8], where near-optimal universal codes for entanglement assisted message transmission over compound
quantum channels with finitely many channel states are constructed. Recently, convex split and position-
decoding have been applied in [32] to determine the second-order capacity of a cqq compound wiretap
channel under the restriction, that the channel state does not vary for the legitimate receiver. For estab-
lishing this result, only the "convex split" part has to be universal, while "position- decoding" is applied on
a channel with fixed state. As a future research goal, it is desirable to close the gap and establish a fully
universal version of these protocol steps.
As mentioned in the introduction, a strong converse cannot be established for the message transmission
capacity of the compound cq channel under average error criterion, even when considering |S | = 2. When
considering a fixed non-vanishing upper bound on the average of decoding error, calculation of capacity
for the compound channel is further problematic as there are examples where the optimistic definition of
the ǫ-capacity yields a strictly larger number than the one yielded by its pessimistic definition (see [15] Re-
mark 13). This implies that in general there is no second rate capacity theorem possible. The implications
of these negative statements are highly interesting in practice, as channel coding in all existing communi-
cation systems (such as wireless cellular and WiMax systems), is done given a fixed error probability. It is
therefore important to design channel codes corresponding to ǫ-capacity of the compound channel, that
is in general larger than its message transmission capacity.
When considering the one-shot approach ([5, 6, 26]) as an alternative to proving capacity results derived
here, one must take certain consequences into account. In this approach, one tries to obtain lower and
upper-bounds for the ǫ-capacity, and then consider the limit ǫ → 0 of these bounds. For the compound
channel however, the capacity is in general strictly smaller than the ǫ-capacity and hence, it is not clear
how these bounds will help, as a lower bound on the ǫ-capacity is not a priori a lower bound on the capac-
ity of the channel. Furthermore, there are some additional highly interesting properties of the ǫ-capacity
and the capacity, even when one considers finite compound channels (|S | <∞):
• The capacity of the finite compound channel is, as a function of the computable compound channel,
a Turing computable function. This is no longer true about infinite compound channels (see [16]).
• The ǫ-capacity of the finite compound channel, as a function of ǫ, is not Banach-Mazur computable,
which in turn means that it is not Turing computable either, as the latter condition is a stronger one
on computability than former.
These results have of course an impact on the effectiveness of the one-shot approach to achieving capacity
results in classical and quantum information theories [16].
A direction for future work given the results derived here, is considering a three dimensional capac-
ity region, establishing a trade-off between the ability of the quantum channel in transmitting common,
public and confidential messages under assumptions of the compound channel model. One must pay at-
tention to the operational difference between public messages (belonging to the set [M1,n]) and those used
for equivocation by Alice (belonging to the set [Ln]).
Another direction for future work given the results derived here, is considering the arbitrarily varying
quantum channel (AVQC) model for the broadcast channel with confidential messages. Given that in all
instances, our error and security requirements, achieve exponential rates of decay, it is perceivable that us-
ing the well known robustification and elimination techniques developed in [3], capacity results including
dichotomy statements can be made for the AVQC model.
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A Auxiliary results
We use the following statements in the text.
Lemma 22 (Tender operator [29]). Let ρ ∈ S (H) and T ∈ L(H) be a positive operator with T ≤ 1H and 1 −
tr(ρT ) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1. Then we have
‖ ρ −
√
Tρ
√
T ‖1≤
√
2ǫ.
Lemma 23. Let {Ws : X → S (H)}s∈S be a set of cq channels and let p ∈ P (X ). Then
lim
α→1 infs∈S
χα(Ws ,p) = inf
s∈S
χ(p,Ws).
Lemma 24. Let p,q ∈ L(H), 0 ≤ p,q ≤ 1H and τ ∈ S (H). It holds
tr(τpqp) ≥ tr(τq)− 2
√
tr(τ(1− p)).
Lemma 25 (cf.[10]). For any two states ρ and σ on Hilbert space H, let δ =‖ ρ −σ ‖1 and dim(H) = d. Then
|S(ρ)− S(σ)| ≤ δ log(d − 1) + h(δ) (A.1)
hold, with h(x) = −(1− x) log(1− x)− x logx, for x ∈ (0,1] and h(0) = 0, the binary entropy.
Lemma 26. [cf. [28], Corollary 2] Let ρ,σ ∈ S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HC ), with ‖ ρ −σ ‖1= δ and dim(HB) = d. It holds
|I(A;B|C,ρ)− I(A;B|C,σ)| ≤ 2
(
δ logd + (1+ δ)h(
δ
1+ δ
)
)
,
wit h, the binary entropy, as defined in the previous lemma.
B Universal classical-quantum superposition coding
In this appendix, we establish a random coding construction of superposition codes for classical-quantum
channels which are a major ingredient for the achievability proofs in Section 5. In particular a detailed
proof of Lemma 9 is provided.
Over the years several code constructions for message transmission over compound cq channels have been
established (see [12, 22, 20, 24]). The arguments we invoke below for proving Lemma 9 rely heavily on
the techniques Mosonyi’s work [24]. Therein properties of the quantum Renyi Divergences and the closely
related "sandwich Renyi divergences" are used to derive universal random coding results for classical-
quantum channels. Below we further elaborate on that approach and extend it by suitable superposition
codes.
To facilitate connecting the discussion below with the arguments in [24] we introduce some notation from
there. For a probability distribution p ∈ P (Y ) and a cq channelW : Y → S (H), we define quantum states
W (p) :=
∑
y∈X
p(y) ·W (y), W(p) :=
∑
y∈X
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗W (y),and pˆ :=
∑
y∈X
p(y) |y〉 〈y| .
For each pair of non-zero positive semi-definite operators ρ,σ and every α ∈ (0,1) we define
Qα(ρ||σ) := tr(ρασ1−α), and Dα(ρ||σ) := 11−α logtr(ρ
ασ1−α)
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from
χα(p,W ) := inf
σ∈S (H)
Dα(W(p)||pˆ⊗ σ) (B.1)
derives. It is known, that the limit α → 1 of the above quantity exists and equals the Holevo quantity
χ(p,W ). Translating to the notation in the statement of Lemma 8, we notice, that χ(p,W ) = I(Y ;B) holds.
Lemma 27. Let W be a set of cq channels each mapping Y to S (K), q a probability distribution on X and rx a
probability distribution on Y for each x ∈ X . It holds
lim
αր1
inf
V∈W
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χα(rx,V ) = inf
V∈W
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χ(rx,V )
The above statement slightly generalizes that of Lemma 3.13 in [24] (regarding the limit from below).
The proof is by a similar argument. We include a proof for the readers convenience.
Proof. Set f (α,V ) :=
∑
x∈X q(x) ·χα(rx,V ) for each α ∈ (0,1) and cq channel V . It holds
lim
αր1
inf
V∈W
f (α,V )
(a)
= lim
αր1
min
V∈W
f (α,V )
(b)
= sup
α∈(0,1)
min
V∈W
f (α,V )
(c)
= min
V∈W
sup
α∈(0,1)
f (α,V )
(d)
= min
V∈W
lim
αր1
f (α,V )
= inf
V∈W
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χ(V ,rx)
The equality in (a) holds by continuity of f (α, ·) for each α ∈ (0,1) (the closure might be performed in any
norm, for example the ‖·‖CQ), (b) is justified, because the argument of the limit is monotonously increasing
on (0,1). The min-max exchange in (c) is an application of Lemma 2.3 from [24], (d) by monotonicity of f
in α, and in (e) the limit αր 1 is performed according to Lemma B.3 in [25].
The starting point for our proof of Lemma 9 is the generic random coding bound from Hayashi and
Nagaoka [23] we state below.
Lemma 28 ([23], cf. [24], Lemma 4.15). Let V : Y → S (K) be a cq channel, M ∈ N and p ∈ P (Y ). There
exists a map (y1, . . . ,yM ) 7→ (Λ1(y), . . . ,ΛM (y)), such that (Λm(y))m∈[M] ⊂ L(K) is a POVM, and, given YM :=
(Y1, . . . ,YM ) of independent random variables each with distribution p, for each ∀α ∈ (0,1), the bound
EYM
[ 1
M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W (Ym)Λm(Y
M )c)
]
≤ 8 ·M1−α ·Qα
(
W(p)||pˆ⊗W (q)
)
holds.
Proof of Lemma 9. Fix n ∈ N and an n-word x ∈ T nq,δ which we assume to be of type λ (i.e. x ∈ T nλ ). We
approximate {Ws}s∈S by a finite τn-net {Ws}s∈Sn ⊂ {Ws}s∈S with τn := 2−
nν
2 with a constant positive number
ν to be determined later. We choose the net small enough to fulfill the cardinality bound log |Sn| ≤ 2 · |X | ·
d2(log6 + nν/2) which is possible by Lemma 30. We introduce abbreviations d := dimKB, rx(·) := r⊗n(·|x)
and r ′x(·) := r ′n,δ(·|x) for each x ∈ X n. Applying Lemma 28 on the cq channel W n := 1|Sn |
∑
s∈SnW
⊗n
s with
p := r ′x, and
M := ⌊exp(n(inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|X,σs)− δ · |X | logd − ν))⌋, (B.2)
we know that choosing a codewords Y1, . . . ,YM i.i.d. according to r
′
x each, allows us to bound the expecta-
tion by
EYM
 1M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W n(Ym)Λm(Y
M )c)
 ≤ 8 ·M1−α ·Qα
 1|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
W
⊗n
s (r
′
x)||rˆ ′x ⊗Wn(r ′x)
 (B.3)
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for each α ∈ (0,1). By linearity of the trace and the expectation, the above inequality implies
EYM
mins∈Sn 1M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W⊗ns (Ym)Λm(YM )c)
 ≤ 8 · |Sn| ·M1−α ·Qα
 1|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
W
⊗n
s (r
′
x)||rˆ ′x ⊗Wn(r ′x)
 . (B.4)
The left hand side of the above inequality can be identified as the expected average error of a random code.
We proceed to further bound the Function Qα on the right hand side. We have
Qα
(
1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
W
⊗n
s (r
′
x)||rˆ ′x ⊗Wn(r ′x)
)
≤ 1
rx(Tr,δ(x))2−α
Qα
(
1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
W
⊗n
s (rx)||rˆx ⊗Wn(rx)
)
. (B.5)
In (B.5) we have used definition of the pruned distribution, and observed operator monotonicity of the
function f (x) = xα for α ∈ [0,1] (cf. [11], Theorem 5.1.9). Following the arguments in proof of Lemma 4.16
[24] we obtain
Qα
( 1
|Sn|
∑
s∈Sn
W
⊗n
s (rx)||rˆx ⊗Wn(q⊗n)
)
≤ 1|Sn|α
∑
s∈Sn
exp
(
(α − 1) ·α ·χα(rx,W⊗ns )
)
· dn(α−1)2
≤ exp
(
(α − 1) ·α ·min
s∈Sn
χα(rx,W
⊗n
s ) + n(α − 1)2 logd + log |Sn|
)
(B.6)
In order to further estimate the error exponent above, we note that for each s ∈ S
χα(W
⊗n
s , rx) =
∑
x∈X
λ(x) ·χα(Ws , r(·|x)) ≥
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χα(Ws , r(·|x))− δ · |X | logd.
In the above, we have used |λ(x) − q(x)| ≤ δ and χα(Ws , r(·|x)) ≤ logd. By Lemma 27, choosing α close
enough to one allows us to bound
α inf
s∈S
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χα(r(·|x),Ws) ≥ inf
s∈S
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χ(r(·|x),Ws)− δ · |X | logd = inf
s∈S
I(Y ;B|X,σs)− δ · |X | logd. (B.7)
where we introduced the notation from the statement of Lemma 8 in the second line. Note, that with our
choice ofM , we have
α inf
s∈S
∑
x∈X
q(x) ·χα(r(·|x),Ws)− 1n logM ≥ ν > 0 (B.8)
Combining the estimates from (B.4) - (B.8) and subsequent upper-bounding the right hand side of (B.3),
we achieve the bound
EYM
mins∈Sn 1M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W⊗ns (Ym)Λm(YM )c)
 ≤ 16 · exp
(
(α − 1) · n(ν + (α − 1)logd +2|X |d2[ log6
n
+
ν
2
])
)
≤ 2−nν/4
Where the last inequality above holds for a fixed choice of α close enough to one and large enough n. By
the property of the τn net and linearity of trace and expectation, we can conclude
EYM
infs∈S 1M
∑
m∈[M]
tr(W⊗ns (Ym)Λm(YM )c)
 ≤ 2−nν/4 + n · 2−nν . (B.9)
We are done.
C Net approximation of arbitrary channel sets
In this section, we introduce the concept of finite nets for approximation of arbitrary channel sets used in
proof of the direct parts of our capacity theorems.
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Definition 29. ForW ⊂ CQ(X ,H) and τ > 0, a τ-net is a finite setWτ := {Wi }i∈Sτ ⊂ CQ(X ,H), with property
that for everyW ∈ W , there exists and index i ∈ [Sn] such that
‖W −Wi ‖CQ< τ. (C.1)
The existence of such τ-net does not readily guarantee that Wτ ⊂ W . The following lemma gives the
existence of a good τ-net contained in the given channel set.
Lemma 30. (cf. [13] Lemma 6) Let W := {Wi }i∈S ⊂ CQ(X ,H) and τ ∈ (0,1/e). There exists a set Wτ :=
{Wi }i∈Sτ ⊂W with such that
1. |Sτ | < ( 6τ )2|X |dim(H)
2
,
2. given any n ∈N, for every i ∈ S, there exists i ′ ∈ Sn such that
‖W⊗ni (x)−W⊗ni ′ (x) ‖1≤ 2nτ, (∀x ∈ X n). (C.2)
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